Social trust is a central concept in contemporary sociology, closely linked to social capital, social cohesion, and institutional performance. Three main forms of trust can be distinguished: generalized trust –the belief that most people, including strangers, can be trusted; particularized trust –directed toward close social circles; and institutional trust, associated with perceptions of legitimacy and institutional performance (Zmerli & Newton, 2017)Zmerli and Newton(2017).

From structural and relational perspectives, social trust functions as a mechanism that allows individuals to act under conditions of uncertainty, reducing the complexity of social interaction and facilitating cooperation beyond direct exchange. This conception draws on classical theories that interpret trust as a means of coping with uncertainty in complex societies, while more recent approaches understand it as a relational resource based on expectations of reciprocity (Hardin, 2002)Hardin(2002). In its moral dimension, trust is viewed as a generalized disposition toward others, grounded in internalized values of equality and justice, and less dependent on direct experience than on learning within egalitarian environments (Uslaner, 2018)Uslaner(2018).

Longitudinal studies in consolidated democracies show a sustained decline in institutional trust, linked to perceived corruption, inequality, and political polarization. According to Norris (2022)Norris(2022), this erosion reflects the gap between citizens’ expectations and institutional performance. Similarly, Wilkinson & Pickett (2009)Wilkinson and Pickett(2009) demonstrate that socioeconomic inequality undermines interpersonal trust and social cohesion. Goubin & Hooghe (2020)Goubin and Hooghe(2020) find that inequality correlates with lower political trust across European countries, while Rothstein & Uslaner (2005)Rothstein and Uslaner(2005) confirm that more egalitarian societies tend to display higher levels of generalized trust.

Comparative research based on surveys such as the European Social Survey (ESS) and the World Values Survey (WVS) has enabled long-term monitoring of these trends (Glatz & Eder, 2020Glatz and Eder(2020); Glatz & Schwerdtfeger, 2022Glatz and Schwerdtfeger(2022); Robbins, 2012Robbins(2012)). Despite methodological advances, debate persists over the link between social and institutional trust, Zmerli & Newton (2017)Zmerli and Newton(2017) argue that no conclusive evidence supports a mutually reinforcing relationship between them.

In this study, social trust is approached as both a core component of social capital and a context-sensitive indicator. Unlike institutional trust, which fluctuates with political circumstances, interpersonal trust reflects more stable dispositions –though still influenced by ideological polarization and the deterioration of institutional quality.

Political ideology plays a significant role in shaping social trust, particularly in contexts of increasing polarization. Recent studies emphasize that not only do substantive ideological differences matter, but so does affective polarization –that is, hostility toward those on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum. As Mason (2018)Mason(2018) notes, politics has increasingly become an extension of social identity, intensifying group-based antagonism and weakening interpersonal trust.

In Spain, Torcal (2023)Torcal(2023) documents a sustained rise in affective polarization, with negative consequences for both social ties and institutional trust. Similar patterns appear in comparative studies linking low social trust with authoritarian attitudes and political exclusion (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010Inglehart and Welzel(2010); Uslaner, 2018Uslaner(2018)). From the perspective of modernization theory, Inglehart and Welzel (2010)Inglehart and Welzel(2010) argue that the transition toward self-expression values fosters interpersonal trust and democratic support, while Uslaner (2002)Uslaner(2002) highlights the moral foundations of trust rooted in equality and reciprocity. Combined with institutional performance (Norris, 2022)Norris(2022), these factors contribute to higher levels of democratic legitimacy.

Over recent decades, the ideological composition of the European Parliament has reflected broader transformations in political culture and polarization among member states. Whereas centrist parties dominated in the early 2000s, the landscape is now more fragmented, with growing representation of populist and Eurosceptic movements –both on the right (European Conservatives and Reformists, Identity and Democracy, Patriots for Europe) and on the left (The Left). This shift illustrates deeper tensions between integration and sovereignty, and between cosmopolitanism and national retrenchment. These trends display regional nuances: in the EU Core, fragmentation has been moderate and has not substantially eroded institutional trust; in the South, the economic crisis widened the gap between citizens and institutions; and in the EU Enlarged, weak institutions and low historical trust have facilitated populist discourse.

Empirical evidence indicates that ideological orientation correlates with differing levels of trust: authoritarian or conservative orientations are generally linked to lower trust toward out-groups and greater institutional skepticism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010Duckitt and Sibley(2010); Zmerli & Newton, 2017Zmerli and Newton(2017)). Likewise, ideological polarization –the increasing separation toward ideological extremes–reduces the willingness to compromise, while affective polarization heightens emotional rejection of ideological opponents (Iyengar et al., 2019bIyengar, Sood and Lelkes(2019); Torcal & Comellas, 2022Torcal and Comellas(2022)).

In summary, the relationship between ideology and social trust is two–dimensional: it depends on both individual orientations and the political context in which it is expressed, becoming especially relevant in environments characterized by disaffection and polarization.

From the early studies on social capital and trust in the 1990s to more recent comparative analyses, the literature consistently highlights the central role of social trust in sustaining democratic support. Foundational works established that interpersonal trust enhances institutional effectiveness and democratic legitimacy (Putnam, 1993Putnam(1993); Newton, 2001Newton(2001); Levi & Stoker, 2000Levi and Stoker(2000); Seligson, 2002Seligson(2002)). These studies emphasized that trust fosters cooperation, civic engagement, and public participation, whereas its erosion can lead to political apathy or the rise of populist and authoritarian alternatives. More recent evidence reinforces this relationship: contexts with higher levels of trust and community engagement tend to have more effective institutions, lower perceived corruption, and more satisfied citizens (Putnam, 2020Putnam(2020); Murtin et al., 2018Murtin, Fleischer, Siegerink and Algan(2018); OECD, 2022OECD(2022); Norris, 2022Norris(2022)).

In settings where interpersonal trust is low, satisfaction with democracy also tends to be lower, which in turn can erode institutional legitimacy. This relationship becomes even more salient in contexts marked by polarization, inequality, and institutional crises, which weaken the foundations of social trust. Although the causal direction between trust and democracy remains debated, comparative evidence points to a strong and consistent association between them. This study examines the extent to which social trust predicts democratic satisfaction across different European contexts, with particular attention to the effects of ideological polarization and regional variation in its intensity. However, this relationship takes different forms depending on the institutional and cultural context of each European region. Understanding these variations is essential for interpreting the empirical results, particularly when comparing the historical EU Core, the Southern countries, and those incorporated through the Eastern enlargements.

Following the examination of the influence of political ideology and democratic satisfaction on social trust, this section extends the analysis to the regional dimension, considering how structural, institutional, and welfare disparities across Europe shape social trust.

In Eastern European countries, democratic consolidation has coincided with persistently low levels of trust. This lack of social trust is reflected in community and interpersonal networks, where authoritarian legacies continue to constrain social cohesion and relational capital (Rapolienė & Aartsen, 2022)Rapolienė and Aartsen(2022). Comparative studies attribute these patterns to structural inequalities and weak traditions of civic engagement (Bertea & Mihei, 2014)Bertea and Mihei(2014). In contrast, in Central and Northern Europe, institutional stability and more developed welfare systems have fostered equality and higher levels of interpersonal trust (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005Rothstein and Uslaner(2005); Glatz & Eder, 2020Glatz and Eder(2020)).

Differences in trust and democratic satisfaction are not only shaped by socioeconomic structures but also by political systems and welfare regimes. Mewes (2024)Mewes(2024) shows that universal welfare regimes, characteristic of Northern and Central Europe, tend to promote trust, while selective or means-tested systems, typical of Southern and Eastern Europe, may erode it –especially when welfare benefits are perceived as undeserved.

Overall, research confirms persistent disparities in trust and democratic satisfaction across Europe. Northern and Western countries exhibit higher levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, supported by robust welfare states, greater equality, and stable political systems (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005)Rothstein and Uslaner(2005). In contrast, Southern and Eastern European countries show lower trust levels, influenced by authoritarian legacies, economic instability, and weaker institutional performance (Norris, 2022Norris(2022); Glatz & Eder, 2020Glatz and Eder(2020)). Olivera (2015)Olivera(2015) also finds significant cross-national differences in the relationship between inequality and trust, though this effect diminishes when controlling for country-specific factors. Instead, variables such as linguistic and ethnic fragmentation, discrimination, and crime rates retain a stable and negative impact on social trust. While some convergence in trust and civic participation has been observed (Sarracino & Mikucka, 2017)Sarracino and Mikucka(2017), these regional divides remain.

In summary, enduring regional differences and Europe’s evolving ideological landscape justify a comparative approach that makes it possible to examine how political polarization and democratic satisfaction are articulated with levels of social trust in each context. On this basis, the hypotheses and analytical strategies presented in the following section are formulated.

Using ESS data, this study adopts a comparative strategy to analyse the evolution of generalized social trust (GTRUST), satisfaction with democracy (STFDEM), and political ideology (IDPOLC). Countries are grouped into three regional blocs: the historical core of the European Union (EU Core), Southern Europe (EU South), and the post‑2004 enlargement countries (EU Enlarged). This classification –grounded in institutional criteria and socio‑economic trajectories– enables comparisons across contexts with different degrees of democratic consolidation, welfare‑state models, and levels of social capital.

The specific objectives (SO) and their corresponding hypotheses (H) are as follows:

SO1: To describe the evolution of GTRUST and STFDEM by regional group.

H1: There is no general downward trend in social trust.

H2: Differences between regional groups outweigh internal variations.

SO2: To analyze the effect of ideological positioning on trust and democratic satisfaction.

H3: Ideological extremes are associated with lower levels of trust and satisfaction across all three regional blocs.

SO3: To explore whether social trust predicts satisfaction with democracy.

H4: A significant relationship exists between the two, with regional and temporal variations.

Nineteen EU countries were selected based on their participation in at least six rounds of the ESS. These countries were grouped as follows: EU Core: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, EU South: Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece (although data are incomplete for some rounds) and EU Enlarged: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.

The total sample consists of more than 300,000 cases, distributed across seven selected ESS rounds between 2002 and 2024 (Rounds 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11). Between the initial and final rounds, five additional waves are included (Rounds 3, 5, 7, 9, and 10). Table 1 details the sample by country for each round prior to weighting for analysis. All cross-national and regional-block comparisons were conducted using the weighting factors recommended by the ESS –specifically, the ANNWEIGHT variable– in accordance with the methodological guidelines outlined by Kaminska (2020)Kaminska(2020). The use of weighted data ensures both representativeness and comparability across regions, correcting for potential differences in sample size among the blocs.

The original variables were transformed and cleaned according to the following specifications:

Generalized social trust (GTRUST): Constructed as the mean of three items measuring interpersonal trust– “Most people try to take advantage of others” (PPLFAIR), “Are people mostly helpful or mostly looking out for themselves?” (PPLHLP), and “Most people can be trusted / you can’t be too careful” (PPLTRST). Only valid values between 0 and 10 were considered. The cross-cultural comparability of the generalized trust item in the ESS has been extensively validated (Reeskens & Hooghe, 2008)Reeskens and Hooghe(2008).

-Satisfaction with democracy (STFDEM): Measured on a 0–10 scale assessing respondents’ satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in their country (“How satisfied with the way democracy works in country?”).

-Political ideology (IDPOLC): Derived from recoding the left–right self-placement scale (LRSCALE, 0–10) into five categories [extreme left (0–2), left (3–4), centre (5), right (6–7), and extreme right (8–10)]. This classification follows the criteria proposed by Scholz & Zuell (2016)Scholz and Zuell(2016) to improve the substantive interpretation of ideological extremes, enhance cross-regional and cross-round comparability, reduce sensitivity to outliers, and allow the use of non-parametric tests, since it does not assume a linear relationship between ideology and trust.

-Country groups (COUNTRYG): Variable classifying countries into three European regions according to institutional and historical criteria of integration –Core, Southern Europe, and Enlarged Europe.

-Periods (YEARC): Aggregates rounds into three temporal blocks [2002–2010 (R1–R5), 2014–2020 (R7–R10), and 2023/24 (R11)] to facilitate longitudinal analysis.

-Weights (ANNWEIGHT): Variable applied in all analyses to incorporate ESS design weights and ensure sample representativeness.

Normality tests (Kolmogorov–Smirnov) indicated that the variables did not follow a normal distribution; therefore, non-parametric techniques (Kruskal–Wallis) were applied to test group differences for specific objectives OE1 and OE2. For the explanatory analysis of OE3 –focused on the relationship between social trust and democratic satisfaction– simple linear regressions were used. This analytical design allows the identification of comparative patterns and the assessment of the robustness of the associations proposed in the theoretical model.

Longitudinal data reveal differentiated trajectories. For the EU Core, trust levels remain high and stable over time (Mean = 5.28 in 2002–2010; 5.53 in 2014–2020 and 2023/24). This consistency supports Hypothesis H1, which posited the absence of a systematic decline.

In the case of the EU South, the mean GTRUST increases slightly in the second wave, followed by a stabilization (Mean = 4.61 – 4.70 and 4.69). The median remains constant (4.67), suggesting a centered distribution with no substantial shifts. And in the EU Enlarged group, the increase is more pronounced, rising from 4.15 to 4.71, which suggests a convergence toward the levels seen in the South. This indicates a sustained improvement: from relatively low levels in 2002–2010 to the latest wave.

Differences between country groups are statistically significant across all periods, according to the Kruskal-Wallis test (p < 0.001). These results confirm Hypothesis H2, which anticipated greater variability between regional blocs than within them. The test was conducted separately for each time period in the series.

When comparing country pairs and disaggregating by temporal segments, the differences remain statistically significant in nearly all cases: in the periods 2002–2010 and 2014–2020, the equality of distributions is rejected for all pairwise comparisons (Kruskal-Wallis, p < 0.001). With one exception, in the third period, the difference between the EU South and EU Enlarged groups is not statistically significant (p = 0.147 for 2023/24). In the latest wave (2023/24), the gap between the EU South and the EU Enlarged has narrowed.

Compared to social trust, the patterns of democratic satisfaction are more varied across regions and over time (Table 2). In the EU Core, a slight decline is observed in the most recent round (Mean = 5.21 – 5.40 and 5.07). In the EU South, satisfaction gradually decreases (5.13 – 4.83 and 4.77), whereas in the EU Enlarged group, satisfaction increases steadily (4.36 – 4.74 and 4.97), reaching a level comparable to the other blocs in 2023/24.

In Southern European countries, this decline may be related to processes of institutional disaffection or perceptions of democratic inefficacy. In contrast, countries in the EU Enlarged group experience a consistent rise in satisfaction, within a political and cultural context that differs significantly from that of the other regions. While the EU Core started with the highest levels of satisfaction and the EU South with the lowest, by the end of the series the three blocs converge, with slightly higher satisfaction levels in the EU Enlarged group.

Overall, these regional differences are also statistically significant (p < 0.001), reinforcing Hypothesis H2. However, the hypothesis of a uniform democratic decline is not supported. When comparing country groups, significant differences appear between the EU South and the EU Enlarged in Rounds 1–5 (2002–2010, p < 0.001), but not in Rounds 7–10 (2014–2020, p = 0.589). Similarly, no significant difference is observed between the EU Enlarged and the EU Core in Round 11 (2023/24, p = 0.259).

Note: M = Mean. IQR=Interquartile Range. The original self-placement ideology variable (IDPOL) was recoded into five categories: 1 = far left (0–2), 2 = left (3–4), 3 = center (5), 4 = right (6–7), 5 = far right (8–10). Recoding was carried out to facilitate comparison across clearly defined ideological groups and to reduce interpretive variability across countries, while maintaining consistency with previous comparative studies (Zuell & Scholz, 2016)Scholz and Zuell(2016).

Over the time series, the ideological distribution in the EU Enlarged group shows a shift toward the right (Mean: 3.22 → 3.32 → 3.25), while the EU Core maintains a stable average, slightly leaning to the left. In Southern Europe, a slight rightward shift is also observed at the end of the period.

Although not the main objective of the analysis, it is relevant to contextualize the evolution of citizens’ ideological positioning in Europe, with particular attention to the extremes of the scale. Table 2 presents the mean, median, and interquartile range (IQR) of the IDPOLC scale for each country group at three points in time: 2002–2010 (Rounds 1–5), 2014–2020 (Rounds 7–10), and 2023/24 (Round 11).

The results indicate statistically significant differences across all time periods (Kruskal-Wallis, p < 0.001), reflecting that ideological patterns vary systematically between regions. In the EU Core group, a slight decrease in the mean is observed (from 2.95 to 2.87), suggesting a modest shift toward more left-leaning positions. This trend is accompanied by a gradual decrease in the median, which remains around 3.00 with a stable IQR –indicating a persistent level of internal diversity.

Among the EU South countries, the mean increases slightly (from 2.84 to 2.98), suggesting a shift toward the right– a trend consistent with the evolution of the scale’s extreme values discussed below. This transformation is also reflected in the stability of the median (3.00), but with an IQR that remains constant, indicating a degree of polarization driven by the extension of the distribution’s right tail.

The most notable trend is found in the EU Enlarged group, which begins with a higher mean (3.22) that rises to 3.32 in 2014–2020 and then slightly decreases to 3.25 in 2023/24. Although the median remains stable (3.00), the drop in the IQR during the final period (from 2.00 to 1.00) suggests a movement toward more ideologically defined positions, with reduced dispersion. In this case, the shift is toward the right of the spectrum.

Table 3 presents the percentages for each ideological group, recoded into five categories: far left, left, center, right, and far right. In all three country groups, there is a notable and sustained decline in the ideological center, accompanied by increases at both extremes –especially the far right in the EU Enlarged group, which reaches 26.2% in Round 11, the highest among the three regional blocs. In contrast, the far left shows similar levels across the three groups by the end of the series (13.7% in both the EU Core and EU South; 14.5% in the EU Enlarged). These results suggest increasing polarization, particularly within the EU Enlarged group, with a gradual erosion of the ideological center.

Note: Values in the same row that do not share the same subscript are significantly different at p < .05 in the test of column proportions. Cells without subscripts are not included in the test. Tests assume equal variances.

Social trust tends to vary significantly across ideological extremes, particularly on the far right, although with regional differences. In the EU Core and EU South, trust levels are higher among those on the left and in the center, whereas in the EU Enlarged group, the far right is associated with higher levels of trust.

Regarding democratic satisfaction, the patterns are more consistent: the extremes –particularly the far left– show lower satisfaction, while the right and far right report higher satisfaction levels, especially in the EU Enlarged group. These findings support Hypothesis H3 by demonstrating significant differences based on ideological positioning (Kruskal-Wallis, p < 0.001).

The analysis of the relationship between ideological positioning and social trust reveals distinct patterns across regions. Aggregated data in Table 4 show that generalized trust tends to be lower at the ideological extremes, particularly on the far right. This trend is consistent with the hypothesis linking ideological polarization to an erosion of interpersonal trust, and it manifests clearly across the three periods analyzed.

In the EU Core countries, between Rounds 1 and 10 (2002–2020), the highest GTRUST scores are found among those in the moderate right group (6–7). In Round 11 (2023/24), trust levels increase at both ends of the spectrum –left and right (means of 5.78 and 5.72, respectively)—while dropping to 5.35 at the far right. The center maintains slightly lower scores (5.41), suggesting a shift toward the poles that does not automatically translate into lower trust levels. In the EU South group, social trust is consistently higher among those on the left, particularly the far left (5.02 in R11), while the lowest values are repeatedly found in the far-right segment (4.82 in R11 and 4.9 in R1–5). The center also shows lower scores compared to the moderate ideological segments. In the EU Enlarged group, the pattern diverges from the rest: social trust is lowest on the far left (4.11 in R7–10; 4.58 in R11) and peaks among the right and far right (5.02 and 5.42 in R11). This is the only group where a clear positive association is observed between right-wing positioning and higher levels of social trust.

These findings confirm that the relationship between ideology and trust is not homogeneous but shows strong regional variation. Moreover, they support two complementary conclusions: (1) political ideology influences social trust, but in ways that differ by region and time period; and (2) differences between country groups exceed ideological differences within countries. The exception may be the EU Enlarged group, where the association between ideology and trust appears more pronounced.

Regarding H3, the results confirm that ideological extremes are associated with distinct levels of social trust. However, the magnitude and direction of these differences vary substantially between regions. Thus, while the existence of an ideological effect is confirmed, its expression is not uniform, suggesting that political and cultural context modulates the impact of ideological polarization on trust. The case of the ideological center deserves further analysis. In all three country groups, social trust in the center remains at intermediate levels, without a clear pattern of improvement or decline. This may reflect the center’s internal heterogeneity or its progressive erosion in favor of more polarized positions.

In terms of democratic satisfaction (STFDEM), differences across ideological categories are statistically significant both within and between country groups (Kruskal-Wallis, p < 0.001). However, the patterns vary considerably. In the EU Core group, during the early rounds (R1–5 and R7–10), satisfaction levels are highest among those on the right and far right (5.77 and 5.89), while the far left reports the lowest levels (4.49 and 4.92). In the most recent period (R11), this dissatisfaction also extends to the far right (5.42), suggesting a convergence of discontent regarding the functioning of democracy.

In the Southern European countries, a similar pattern is observed in R1–5 and R7–10, where satisfaction levels are lower at the extremes –particularly among the far left– while in R11, the center registers the lowest score (4.72). This may indicate a shift of discontent toward more moderate segments. For the EU Enlarged countries, the pattern is more pronounced: across all three periods, the highest satisfaction levels are consistently observed among the right and far right (5.48 and 5.57 in R7–10; 5.42 in R11), while the lowest values are systematically found among the far left (4.01, 3.56, and 3.76).

In sum, the data suggest that the relationship between ideology and satisfaction with democracy is more consistent and pronounced than in the case of social trust, indicating a greater degree of ideological polarization in citizens’ evaluations of the democratic system.

Note: the asterisk (*) indicates the lowest mean values. Df=degrees of freedom.

The findings related to satisfaction with democracy further support H3, showing that ideological extremes display distinct patterns in their evaluation of democratic functioning. Unlike the case of social trust, this relationship is clearer and more consistent –particularly in the EU Enlarged group, where the far right systematically reports the highest levels of satisfaction. However, the results also indicate that the effects of ideological polarization on satisfaction vary depending on the political and historical context of each country group, suggesting that the interaction between ideological structure and institutional perception would require context-specific political and social analysis.

These findings justifify a focused análisis in the following section, which examines the relationship between GTRUST and STFDEM from a comparative and longitudinal perspective, aiming to better understand the factors linking social trust to democratic support

Across the three periods analyzed, the relationship between generalized social trust (GTRUST) and satisfaction with democracy (STFDEM) remains positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), confirming H4. The results presented in Table 5 and Figure 1 (a–c) reveal substantial regional differences and a temporal evolution that reflects the institutional and social transformations of the European context.

The EU Core consistently displays the highest coefficients (B = 0.404 → 0.490 → 0.471), suggesting that interpersonal trust functions as a structural component of democratic legitimacy. This pattern aligns with Rothstein and Uslaner (2005)Rothstein and Uslaner(2005), who argue that societies with stable institutions, lower perceived corruption, and universal welfare regimes tend to reproduce virtuous circles of trust and democratic effectiveness.

In contrast, the Southern European countries maintain lower and more stable coefficients (B ≈ 0.27–0.28). This weaker association may be linked to factors such as the impact of the economic crisis, political disaffection, or institutional weakness, which, according to Norris (2022)Norris(2022) and Mewes (2024)Mewes(2024), constrain the integrative role of social trust in democratic legitimacy. In these contexts, trust remains relevant but is mediated by perceptions of inequality and the lower effectiveness of public institutions.

The EU Enlarged countries, in turn, show an intermediate pattern during the first two periods, followed by a slight decline in the most recent round (B = 0.354 → 0.370 → 0.268). This pattern, also visible in Figure 1c, may reflect an initial phase of democratic consolidation followed by increasing political polarization or a deterioration of institutional trust, consistent with the findings of Bertea and Mihei (2014)Bertea and Mihei(2014). In these cases, the relationship between social trust and democratic satisfaction appears more sensitive to contextual factors such as government quality or economic performance.

Note: B = unstandardized coefficient; Std. B = standardized coefficient; CI = 95% confidence interval. Coefficients are weighted using ANWEIGHT.

Overall, the increase of the effect in the core block and its stability or decline in the other two contexts suggest that institutional robustness and socioeconomic equality are conditions that strengthen the link between social trust and democratic satisfaction. This result reinforces the arguments of Putnam (2020)Putnam(2020) and the OECD (2022)OECD(2022) on the importance of social capital as a foundation for democratic legitimacy and institutional resilience.